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3Common Elements in the Governance of Deregulated Electricity Markets,
Telecommunications Markets and Payments Systems.
We use the telecommunications industry and electricity market in New Zealand, and
payments systems in Canada and New Zealand to examine the implications of modern
network technology for the organisation and governance of deregulated markets. Our analysis
identifies natural monopoly components of networks as the key issue for the governance of
these markets. We show how technological change has enhanced the scope for competition
and reduced the desirability of public management and regulation in network industries.  We
argue that where natural monopoly or other problems persist private joint ventures are
superior to public sector monopoly as a means of organising the activity. Light-handed
regulation, in which markets are constrained only by economy-wide competition law,
provides for the development of efficient private solutions to the special governance
problems of network industries.
41. INTRODUCTION
The markets for telecommunications, electricity and payments services are network
industries.  By this we mean that they are characterised by multiple delivery nodes which use
a common production technology and a central facility for the supply of a key input. Markets
may comprise one or more networks that compete using different technologies, and where
more than one network exists in a market, they may or may not be connected.  Historically it
has been assumed that many networks had natural monopoly properties (production costs
would be minimized when a single network supplied the whole market).  The result has been
that heavy regulatory management has complicated the governance structures of network
industries and, in many cases, the networks have been internalised within public or
community owned vertically integrated monopolies.1 The common elements in the
governance structures of telecommunications, electricity and payments reflect the similarity
of the issues associated with networks and the responses of markets and governments to
them.
Recent technological change has challenged these notions about the potential for competition
within and between networks.2 This combined with the centrality of governance
arrangements to the performance of network industries has prompted a reconsideration of the
optimal governance arrangements, including the rationale for regulation and public
ownership. Technological change is proceeding at different speeds in different industries, so
we can learn something about the future of all network industries by looking at the recent
history and current structure of those that have been most affected by technological change.
In this paper we:
1 Provide a framework for the economic analysis of the structure of network industries,
focussing on horizontal and vertical relationships and the role of private firms, public
enterprises, joint ventures and regulation.
                                                          
1 By governance we mean the mechanisms for co-ordination and control that are established by the ownership
and regulatory structures associated with markets.
2 These notions have also been challenged by improved understanding of governance and political economy
issues.
52 Analyse the process by which technical change has affected the optimal
organisational structure of network industries and the governance arrangements that flow
from them.
3 Provide a typology of network industry structures, and explain how the
telecommunications, electricity and payments’ networks in New Zealand and elsewhere have
evolved in response to technical change.
Our focus is on governance and, in particular, on the role and significance of joint ventures,
regulatory intervention, and public/community ownership.  Our argument is that technical
change has fundamentally altered the characteristics that underlie joint ventures and
government ownership/regulation of network industries.  As technical change allows
networks to be transformed into markets, it is vital that regulatory and ownership structures
evolve consistent with this.  The impact of technical change is to make privatisation of public
or community enterprises operating in networks,3 and the removal of heavy-handed
regulation such as rate of return of price caps, necessary for the efficient development of
network industries such as telecommunications, electricity and payments.  In these
circumstances, we argue, private providers operating in a competitive market environment
and subject only to standard competition and company laws provide the optimal governance
structures for network industries confronted by rapid technical change.
2. TECHNICAL CHANGE: NATURE AND IMPACT
Much of the current technological and organisational change in markets is being driven by
very rapid advances in the use of electronics and the application of computer technology to
industrial processes.4 The implications of this change for industry performance vary between
different markets, but all have been affected by reductions in their costs, changes in the
availability and quality of information, the creation of new markets, and the opening of
                                                          
3 Privatisation implies a change in the ownership of the assets, as well as a change in the extent of competition
and the governance structures associated with the market.
4 The substance of this discussion is unaffected by the sources of technological change. We would argue that
there is no unique source or cause, and that technological advance and diffusion are influenced by institutional
arrangements. (See Archibugian and Michie (1998) for some discussion of institutional and neoclassical
approaches to understanding technical change).
6competition within and between markets.5 These changes have effected the optimal
organisation and governance structures of network industries in two ways. First, they have
challenged traditional public policy towards network industries by making competition
feasible where natural monopolies existed before. This has occurred through reductions in
the cost of technological solutions to interconnection between networks as well as through
the potential for competition in the provision of core facilities within networks. In addition,
we take the view that the speed and uncertainty of technical change has affected the optimal
governance structure as well. We now review the contributing factors.
2.1 Changed Costs
Technological change has lowered costs in networks, increasing the profits of incumbent
firms.6 Where regulation has allowed it, these markets have attracted new entrants whose
activities have been instrumental in the introduction of new products and lower prices for
basic services. Technological change may also alter industry cost characteristics influencing,
for example, the nature and extent of any economies of scale and scope. These changes may
in turn lead to substantial changes in the credibility of the claim of certain industries and
firms to natural monopoly status.7
For these reasons, industries and networks affected by rapid technological change may
experience lower prices and an expansion in output. Substantial industry output growth will
affect the functional economies of scope defined by Stigler (1951) and produce
specialisation, as those functions that do not enjoy increasing returns are split off. The
equipment businesses of telecommunications companies have been shed as output has grown
and this may be an example of such specialisation. Another example of output - induced
structural change may be infrastructure firms contracting out customer services.
                                                          
5 By competition  between markets we mean that the gaps in the chain of substitution possibilities between goods
(Tirole, 1988, 12-13) have narrowed or vanished leading to fewer, larger markets: an example is the
convergence of modes of communication.
6 See Norsworthy and Jang (1992) for analysis of rapid cost reduction in the computing industry and
implications for the measurement of productivity.
7 For example, empirical work by Shin and J. Ying (1992) concludes that in telecommunications the structure of
local service costs is not that of natural monopoly.
7The lowered costs and the use of one network by another network industry have provided
new sources of competition and certain changes in economies of scope. A prominent
example is modern electricity companies’ need for electronic communications networks, and
the fact that if a new electricity network is established the extra cost of laying cable for
telecommunications is negligible. The telecommunication networks of electricity companies
can be used for bypass, and thus compete with telecommunications companies. The
separation of banking and insurance transaction networks is now artificial.
2.2 Unpredictability and Competition
The timing of the arrival of new technology is unpredictable, as are its costs and
characteristics. The prospect of new technology affects investment decisions by incumbent
firms and by potential entrants (Choi (1994)). It affects strategic decisionmaking, the best
time to invest and is affected by the intensity of prospective competition. Although formal
analysis is complex, the more intense the competition, or the more likely is competition, the
more rapidly it pays a firm to invest in new technology.8 There are competitive dangers in
waiting for additional good “news” about new-technology investments.
Uncertainty will also affect pricing and investment and hence market performance.  The
uncertainty inherent in the arrival of new technology, its future cost and characteristics all
combine to complicate investment and pricing decisions. The calculation of average
incremental costs, for example, depends critically on expectations of the future – the
economic life of capital equipment, and output – and there can be legitimate substantial
variations in estimates of average incremental cost, and output that are based on the same
information. Furthermore, investment in changed technology is often, of necessity,
substantial. Thus, new technology investment decisions often entail considerable size and
risk.
The high likelihood of the arrival of new technology and the, often consequent, threat of
entry will affect co-operative behaviour among existing firms. Particularly, where entry is
economically feasible, the arrival of technology can be viewed as a shock to established
arrangements. In this environment, the strong possibility of new technology is likely to
8restrict the payoff to firms from committing to co-operative (collusive) arrangements. In
competitive network industries there is a trade-off between co-operation - through inter-
network access agreements - and competition. The prospect of technological surprises will
tend to advance non-co-operative behaviour, and thence competition, among firms more
generally.
The rapid, uncertain appearance of new technology reduces a firm’s strategic planning
horizon for specific investments and provides an incentive to be more cognisant of a
portfolio approach to strategic investments. It may also promote the exit and entry of firms
and as we shall discuss, dynamically changing joint ventures. The shorter planning horizon is
a necessary reaction to the uncertainty in the anticipation of new developments, and of the
consequent higher discount rate that can be expected to result. More use of a portfolio
approach represents an attempt to manage the risk.
2.3 Asymmetric Information: Rapid Standardisation
Some developments have rendered industry costs more transparent and reduced the problem
of specialist knowledge that has always bedevilled managing large organisations.
Existing computer and related technologies now combine many functions and much power in
components whose functions can be well understood by non-specialists, even if the
technology represented in the components requires very advanced knowledge to comprehend.
In addition, these components have become standardised, compatible with different
technologies, very reliable and easy to replace. They are often sourced from various suppliers
and hence their characteristics are well known by all companies. Of course, specialist
personnel are critical to the design and operation of network companies, but their role and
importance in managing the company has changed.
In the past, employee knowledge of engineering was very useful in most positions of a
telecommunications company, if only for one-off problem solving and communication
among employees - in part, because of internally produced equipment and internal company-
specific solutions to problems. Now, detailed knowledge of components is inessential for
                                                                                                                                                                                   
8 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994, 16-19), where the nature of increased competition is made specific.
9good management.
This development has a number of implications for organisational governance. Where
specialist knowledge is important for the operation of a company there is a communication
problem: certain employees know more about aspects of the business than do managers. In
economists’ jargon there is an asymmetry of information that gives the specialists, perhaps at
the expense of managers, more decisionmaking power. This affects company performance
because more time and other resources have to be allocated to the task of communication
itself when asymmetric information is present: for example, more employee monitoring is
required. Within any organisation there must always be employees with different knowledge,
but the reduction in the importance of knowledge differences lowers the cost of
communicating and monitoring within an organisation.  It reduces the importance of
organisational-specific knowledge. This change has wide ramifications for organisations and
their governance.
The reduction in the importance of organisational-specific knowledge, skills and specialisms
reduces the costs of asymmetric information. It means that executives can be drawn from a
wider pool of persons, and this should improve management.9 The more vigorous
competitive environment generated by technological advance will demand CEOs that give
companies strategic directions and leadership, rather than direction on technical issues. The
risky nature of investments mean that efficient investment decisions will generally be best
made by those that are accountable for the outcomes and thus bear the risk.
The availability of standardised, reliable, powerful, multi-task componentry will also affect
competition between firms because competitors can more accurately estimate other firms’
costs.10  Improved knowledge of competitors affects competition because it reduces scope for
incumbent firms or potential entrants to strategically misrepresent their costs in order to
influence other firms’ actions. An incumbent’s costs will depend upon past investment and
hence may be more difficult to calculate than those of an entrant. Various scenarios are
possible, but it is likely that better knowledge of costs by all companies will improve the
                                                          
9 See Friedlander et. al. (1992) for a discussion and evaluation of the importance of CEOs’ background training
and experience for the operation of railways.




2.4 New Markets and Products
Perhaps the most evident economic outcomes of technical change appear in the creation of
new products and markets. As it relaxes existing constraints and opens up possibilities it can
generate competition. Spot markets in electricity, for example, would not be economically
feasible without recent developments in electronics and telecommunications.
3. NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
In networks, complementary goods or services are combined to produce composite products.
Economides (1993) argues that complementarity is the essential relationship defining a
network, while compatibility and co-ordination are the components required to realise the
complementarity.  In addition, it is often claimed that networks are characterised by
externalities resulting from the fact that the network becomes more valuable as its coverage
is increased (they exhibit positive critical mass).
Networks are also characterised by facilities that are natural monopolies.  In the industries
considered in this paper, pylons, underground sleeves and cables for the distribution of
electricity, telecommunications cables, and the switches and messaging systems that form the
backbone of the electronic payments system have all been viewed as facilities that, once in
place, could not efficiently be duplicated.
The key characteristics of the network industries that we consider are depicted in Table 1.
They reveal great similarities across the three industries. They also represent the more limited
view of network characteristics than that of some writers who would ascribe to network
externalities some standard characteristics of markets that are simply a consequence of
exchange in a standard market setting (for example, see Economides’ (1993, 90) discussion
                                                          
11 Changing assymetric information will also influence the efficiency of regulation, and even the relative efficiency of
state owned and private but regulated firms. This point of Willig (1993) is developed by Evans(1998).
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Table 1: Network Characteristics
Networks
Key Characteristics Payments(P) Telecommunications(T) Electricity(E)
Costs High Fixed yes yes yes
Low Marginal yes yes yes
Short Run Marginal Cost Flat then abrupt Flat then abrupt Flat then abrupt
Network Externality Message necessarily follows all
available routes no no yes
In Demand yes yes no
Technological Change Speed of fast fast moderate
Economies Scale yes yes yes
Scope P&T P&T&E P&T&E
Traffic Unidirectional not usually no Normally has been
Multidirectional usually yes increasingly





Risk Cost of system failure (for any reason)
very high very high very high
System failure causes physical damage
to system/non-system equipment
no no yes
Externalities in failure ? ? ?
Security (as in defence of fraud) yes an issue an issue
Compatibility Typically required for other networks yes yes yes
Nature of the Product Usage/characteristics measurable with
existing technology yes yes yes
Customer willingness to pay directly
measurable to prices yes yes yes
Message identifiability yes yes no
Final(F)/ Intermediate(I) Demand I I&F I&F
Bypass By alt. network @ feasible cost yes yes to a degree
By other modes cash, e-cash electronic and standard mail oil/gas/insulation, etc
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one that there are externalities where the addition of one or more consumers to the network
raises the (expected) utility of other customers even at existing prices.
The exact nature and importance of network externalities is a matter of some controversy in
the economic literature. It is best summarised by the two articles - Katz and Shapiro (1994)
and Liebowitz and Margolis (1994). There are those that would place great weight on special
externalities (Katz and Shapiro op cit) and those that regard networks simply as examples of
markets in general equilibrium. We consider that the latter view generally results from
plausible market definitions and that it is in accord with evidence. Under this view the key
feature of networks is that all or part of them has the natural monopoly characteristic - that
the market will not support duplicate or parallel networks.
3.1 Governance
The governance structure of a market consists of mechanisms for control and co-ordination
associated with patterns of ownership and regulation.  Where a firm has a monopoly, the
governance arrangements for that firm will be synonymous with those for the market.  Where
publicly owned firms operate in the market, the government regulation and the structure of
the industry become intertwined.
We distinguish between governance structures that have centralised and de-centralised
control and co-ordination.  An extreme form of centralised control is that which has been
associated with centrally planned economies. Here control and co-ordination are the direct
responsibility of government and governance is economy-wide. Centralised control has
ranged from central allocation of finance, subsidies in accordance with centrally determined
strategic directions, to centrally planned control processes that have these features plus
detailed production plans and targets that serve as criteria for performance. While there have
been some, now somewhat tarnished, successes in countries (Japan) that adopted industrial
strategic central planning, there have been widespread failures of the more extreme versions
of centralised control and co-ordination (countries of Eastern Europe).  In many other
western economies industry governance has been devolved to the industry level. Here
centralised control appears, as firms (industries) owned by the government, or firms privately
owned and subject to industry regulation through an industry specific regulatory body. It is
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characterised by a lack of open entry: it typically requires some regulatory/statutory
conditions or constraints protection for incumbent(s). For much of the last century network
industries have been commonly governed by industry-specific centralised control.
In general, the framework for the governance of network industries may be divided into four
categories:
4 Light-handed regulation.  Here, the governance structure is provided by the operations
of private sector firms and the contractual relationships associated with the market.  The
role of government is confined to the establishment of a framework for property rights and
competition policy.  This structure includes voluntary industry self-regulation and joint
ventures between competing firms. The key feature of this regime is open entry and an
underlying presumption that competition is desirable. Light-handed regulation precludes
statutory restraints on entry and on-going specific regulation based on the state of the
market.
5 Government recognition of industry self-regulation.  This governance structure
provides statutory recognition of policies agreed by market participants.  It encourages co-
operation among market participants, as well as the planning of development and
competition.
6 Heavy government regulation of private market activity.  The governance structure
established here is shaped by regulatory policies and interventions that are industry
specific, and may include restrictions on competitive strategies, requirements to undertake
certain activities or to implement cross-subsidies, and restrictions on rates of return.
7 Direct public sector provision of services, including community and government
ownership of firms, and legislative recognition of state monopoly provision of the service.
This governance structure implies both government regulation and government ownership.
For network industries, the governance structures of the past have been determined by a
complex range of efficiency and other objectives.  For example, the choice of heavy
regulation or government monopoly provision in some network industries may have reflected
the natural monopoly status of the market.  This was often linked to a desire to implement
cross-subsidies for different consumers and to meet the demands of certain interest groups
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(including the regulated firms).   In addition, government intervention was often explicitly
justified by concerns about security of supply and the safety of the services provided in the
market (especially where these were regarded as having economy-wide impacts).
There are two important common characteristics of private sector and government-dominated
governance structures. The first is that in market economies the discipline of self-regulation
is available under both forms of governance. The second common feature is that there is
always the threat of government action that materially changes the rules of the markets. In the
case of light-handed regulation the imposition of further price controls and regulation
remains an ongoing threat to market participants. In the case of government control, there is
the threat to market participants of changes in the regulatory constraints and processes. The
features that most set the two industry governance arrangements apart are that, under light-
handed regulation:
• there is no industry-specific regulatory body that continuously regulates using market
information, and
• and no legal barriers to open entry.
Neither of these will apply in cases of full government control of the market.
3.2 Firms and Markets
In the absence of government intervention, owners of firms will determine the governance
arrangements of markets. To do this the owners of firms will make choices about three
fundamental issues: the extent to which co-ordination will be achieved by centralisation, the
boundaries of the firm, and the extent to which they will engage in co-operation with
competing firms.  In this section we consider the first two choices, leaving the consideration
of co-operation through joint ventures to section 3.3.
Co-ordination of the activities of the agents employed by the firm may be achieved by
allowing them to act independently produce in response to incentives and minimal
monitoring.  Alternatively, a centralised system approach to co-ordination provides explicit
instructions to agents and involves intensive monitoring to ensure compliance. The balance
will vary in response to the nature of the organization, the decisions and functions being
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undertaken,12 and the importance of asymmetric information in the particular market being
considered. Services that are hard to quantify and assess often require a different balance
between incentive and monitoring contracts, and thus different concomitant governance
structures, than those of measurable goods and services (Brock and Evans (1996), and
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991)). However, networks transmit quantifiable outputs, and
hence measurability of their outputs carries no special implications for the specification of
their governance arrangements. In consequence, the private sector model of voluntary
governance can serve as a benchmark for the application of the principles of governance to
network industries.
Firms engage in a series of discrete functions that determine the scope of their activities.  It is
usually argued that the boundaries of the firm are determined by transaction costs that are
determined by the specificity of assets, frequency of transactions, costs of monitoring and
contract enforcement, and the number of transacting parties (Coase 1937; Williamson 1989).
Where there are high transactions costs associated with contracting for services or products,
they will be internalised within the firm.  Stigler (1951) has pointed out that while the
activities of the firm may be characterised by economies of scale, increases in the size of
markets will make it feasible for firms to spin off to the market those activities for which
economies of scale are not present.  Firms are constantly reassessing which activities are
optimally conducted within the firm.
3.3 Joint Ventures
In network industries, joint ventures are commonly used to provide inputs that their members
use to produce outputs that are sold in a market where other members of the joint venture
will be competitors.  Joint ventures provide for vertical integration without the need for each
individual firm in the market to undertake the activity independently.
Joint ventures are often explained as a response to a co-ordination problem or the need for
standardisation.  (Carlton and Frankel 1995; McMillan 1997).  In addition, it seems likely
that joint ventures in network industries relate to asymmetric information and
                                                          
12 Complementary activities and strategic planning, for example, are typically best carried out with a degree of
centralized control in order to achieve gains in co-ordination.
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complementarities within the network.  For example, the potential for holdup and other forms
of opportunism may be too great to allow a private independent firm to undertake the
functions of the joint venture.  However, each of these problems would, in the standard
transactions cost-based theory of the firm, be used as a basis for internalising production
within the firm.  Why are joint ventures used instead?
While each firm would like to internalise the activity for the reasons outlined above, the
natural monopoly property means that minimum average cost in the activity is achieved at a
level of output greater than or equal to the whole market.  Since control of this activity by an
individual firm will raise the potential for monopoly profits, a joint venture offers the
possibility of minimising costs while at the same time dealing with the monopoly problem
created by the size of the market and the technology prevailing at the time.
An extension of the natural monopoly property explains why a joint venture is used instead
of the services being provided by an independent supplier. The services are may be unique to
a single network, involve large capital investment, and there will be the potential for
opportunism on the part of potential providers of the services or free riding by some market
participants.13  Supply by firms involved in horizontally linked markets outside the network
may be precluded by regulatory barriers.  These may make it very costly for any individual
firm (either independent or operating in the output market) to bear the risk associated with
the supply of the inputs to the market.  In these circumstances, joint ventures will be risk-
sharing agreements.
We argue that joint ventures provide the efficient approach to vertical integration in the
presence of natural monopoly and downstream competition on product and cost variety. We
regard voluntary industry joint ventures as superior to public provision of core services
because, absent regulation, the services of the joint venture will be contestable.  Any member
of the joint venture may adopt an independent strategy, and third party competitors may enter
to provide competing services.
                                                          
13 Referring to the case of joint ventures in R and D, Phlips (1995, 73) suggests that to the extent that joint
ventures are successful their main feature is that they internalize spillovers and eliminate free riding.
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Much of the recent work on joint ventures has, however, focussed on the potential for the
joint venture partners to invoke rules that reduce competition and consumer welfare (Carlton
and Salop (1996), Carlton and Frankel (1995), Evans and Schmalensee (1995)).  Economides
and Salop (1992: 107) argue that the efficiency implications of joint ownership of a firm
producing an input for a network involves a tradeoff between the welfare gains from vertical
integration of complementary products and the losses from horizontal integration of
competing products.  Carlton and Salop (1996 : 330 – 335) outline three types of competitive
harm that may result from the activities of a joint venture.
1 Output Market Exclusion.  Exclusionary access rules may be used to disadvantage
rivals by limiting their ability to compete in the output markets for which the services
provided by the joint venture are complementary.  Here, the number of existing and
competing members of the joint venture may not be the issue.  If a new entrant wishes to
access the joint venture facility to introduce a new technology into the output market, then
the incumbents may attempt to exclude them from accessing the joint venture facility.  This
strategy may provide a means of keeping prices in the output market higher than they would
otherwise have been.
2 Input Market Exclusion.  If the joint venture agreement precludes members
purchasing inputs from any other source, then it will limit the contestability of the input
market.  This may be especially important if growth in the size of the market or technological
change make it efficient for the input market to be served by more than one firm.
3 Supporting Price Coordination.  Joint ventures may provide a vehicle within which
participants in the output market agree to raise prices or limit output.  Joint ventures may be
particularly effective in the cartelisation of an industry because they can use the threat of
expulsion from participation in the input market to discipline members.  Provision for
exclusive purchase from the joint venture may preclude any firm competing in the output
market by finding an alternative and lower cost supplier of the input.  Finally, it may be
possible for the joint venture agreement to exclude partners from offering in the output
market new products that do not use the inputs of the joint venture.
3.4 Joint Ventures and the Governance of Markets
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In the markets considered in this paper government intervention has been common.  In these
industries, joint venture arrangements have often been sanctioned by government.  Indeed,
sanction of a joint venture arrangement has often been combined with a public interest
mandate to plan the evolution of the system.14  Other motivations run from the apparently
efficient (concerns with safety) to those that are clearly redistributive in nature.  The ability
of a joint venture to result in competitive harm will be positively to the strength of the
mandate and any exclusivity that government regulation bestows on it.  Below we consider
the case of both the New Zealand electricity market and the Canadian and Australian
payments systems as examples of network markets where government sanctioned joint
ventures have, or may have, the potential to introduce competitive harm.
4. THE EVOLUTION OF NETWORK GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
Figure 1 provides a diagrammatic representation of the alternative market structures
associated with network industries such as telecommunications, electricity and financial
payments.  We distinguish between an input market (where the natural monopoly occurs) and
output market (where there is the potential for some competing privately owned firms to
operate) and the consumer products produced.15
The single network version of the market may be structured in two ways.  In the first, the
whole network is internalised within a vertically integrated monopoly which could be
governed by rate of return regulation (if privately owned) or a government-owned entity.  The
second alternative arises from the existence of private profit maximising firms competing in
the output market, and a joint venture established by these firms in the input market.  There
are also two possibilities for competing networks.  The first is that there would be two
competing vertically integrated firms (in which case one might be government owned, or
both might be subject to rate of return regulation).  The second alternative is that there are
two competing networks, each with a joint venture supplying inputs to the market.
                                                          
14 This is in complete accord with the Milgrom and Roberts (1992, 106-113) idea that centralized decision
making may be efficient where product development is taking place.
15 The issues represented in Figure 1 would not be altered if the joint venture occurred in the output market
rather than the input market.
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Figure 1 also provides a representation of competing networks.  The networks may either be
internalised within vertically integrated firms or each network can consist of competing firms
who obtain inputs from separate joint ventures.  Here, the two networks produce inputs that
are direct competitors but are technologically incompatible.  The result is that the networks
compete directly, and interconnection between them is not possible.  Examples include Visa /
Mastercard, and Analogue/GSM cellular services.
The final alternative completes the transformation of the network to a market.  Here, the
inputs to product A are provided by a number of competing third party producers who also
provide inputs to related products such as B and C.  The output market changes because of
the potential for firms in related industries to enter, utilise the output of the competitive input
market, and produce complementary products to those originally associated with the network.
Freed from the constraints provided by a single complementary input and the restrictions of
compatibility, positive size externalities associated with the network are transferred to a
wider market.
Competition within and across networks hinges crucially on three developments:
1. Low cost technological solutions to compatibility problems, so that providers of a service
in one network may compete with service providers in another network.
2. Convergence in technologies that allows firms in related areas to enter the input and output
markets, bringing increased competition and a wider range of inputs and products within the
scope of the network.
3. Growth in the size of the market which makes it feasible to provide competitive provision
of inputs.
The pattern of competition network characteristics and governance possibilities is depicted in
Table 2.
4.1 Implications of Rapid Technological Advance for Governance.
Let us start with an optimal industry governance structure that is in static equilibrium and ask
the question: how will it change with an increase in the rate of technological change? The
following propositions suggest themselves.
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1 The rapid standardisation of components and the concomitant reduction in requirement
for firm-specific knowledge; suggests that the optimal firm size will get smaller. More
transactions can be left to the market place, and contracting out becomes more attractive.
2 Extensive and rapid output growth may lead to more specialisation (Stigler (1951)). This
too supports the proposition that there will be more contracting out and divestiture of
activities.
3 To the extent that centralised control requires lines of communication and mechanisms of
enforcement that require time to process and implement decisions, more rapid technological
change shifts that balance of centralisation from centralised to de-centralised where
decisionmaking is more responsive to local information.
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Figure 1:Diagramatic Representation of Market Structures
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whole market




1 Generally investments are large and carry high risks that stem from legitimate
divergences in expectations. Internalising the risk requires that the investment decision be
made by those that bear the outcomes.16 It suggests that bodies, eg stakeholders such as
regulators, that do not carry the risk directly should not make investment decisions.
2 Shortened planning horizons are likely to affect the need for the co-ordination function.
To the extent that this occurs jointly with firms using imported technology – technology that
is not grown within the company, and although new, consists of standardised components –
less centralised co-ordination will be required and a more de-centralised governance structure
may become efficient.
3 Emerging new markets and changing sources of economies of scope suggest a shift in
balance from centralised to de-centralised control. Centralised control has to span the
markets across which economies of scope are (potentially) developing if they are to be
adopted, as it becomes efficient for adoption to occur.
These changes serve to undermine the rationale for, and the feasibility of, joint venture
and/or public monopoly management of the network.  Convergence in technologies
undermines the ability of the network manager to contain activity within the technology of
that network.  It reduces the specificity of the assets, and as a consequence, reduces the gains
from managerial co-ordination within the network.  Convergence in technologies also puts
pricing pressure on the activities of the network and makes it difficult for the incumbents in
the market to continue to compete within the technological and pricing constraints imposed
by the network.  Co-ordination within networks and the viability of joint ventures will be
undermined by a large increase in the firms who wish to be members of or to utilise the
facilities of the joint venture, as well as by the potential to use alternative technologies.
Management of risk that internalises investment outcomes with investors requires limiting
the direct role of stakeholders – consumers and political interest groups – in investment
decisions. This further implies a shift from specific to light-handed regulation.
                                                          
16 See Hathaway (1997) for the argument that enterprise risk should not be spread beyond the enterprise itself,
even if it is government ownership.
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For these reasons, pressure for dissolution of a centralised network structure will come from
members of the joint venture, who are constrained by the co-operative framework in meeting
the competition that they face.  This will be particularly important if some members of the
joint venture are less able to meet this competition, and attempt to use the joint venture and
regulatory recognition of it to insulate themselves from competition.  If the network contains
some element of public monopoly provision, then pressure comes from two sources. Services
that are close substitutes for the outputs of the original network will emerge in unregulated
markets.  Consumer awareness of these alternative services will result in switching and a
concomitant reduction in market share for the original network.  The pressure that this
provides to obtain greater efficiency in the operation of the original network often results in
privatisation, which is in itself a necessary step in the transition from network to market.
5 ELECTRICITY , TELECOMMUNICATIONS,  AND PAYMENTS
   NETWORKS
5.1 Electricity
The reform of the New Zealand Electricity industry has lagged behind that of other sectors
(see Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson and Teece (1996)), and both public policy and the structure of
the industry are still evolving. Technological advances of the last five years have made
feasible a range of new approaches to competition in electricity markets, and these are now
central to the reform that is being undertaken.
In 1903 the Government passed legislation vesting in it the sole right to use water for
generating electricity (see Beeche (1950) and Speer (1962)). From about this time it began
investing in electricity plants and acquiring those existing plants that were privately held. The
special-purpose Government department that owned and managed generation and the national
transmission grid dates from 1961. Distribution networks were typically of a community trust
form, or departments within local government. The path of change is illustrated, in Table 3.
To date, New Zealand’s standard light-handed regulatory regime has been applicable to the
electricity market: open entry is permitted and there has been no industry-specific price
control. Any consumer is able to choose their supplier. Final purchase of electricity sourced
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from outside a retail area is currently 7% of total electricity dispersed by retail companies.17
This represents some discipline on the pricing of area retailers but the extent of this effect
will depend upon the existence of other barriers to entry.
Culy, Read and Wright (1995) report that real wholesale electricity prices declined by 8
percent between 1987 and 1991, and that between 1991 and 1995 they were roughly constant
in real terms. More recent data18 indicate that the wholesale price of electricity has declined
in real terms between 1995 and 1997 by approximately 10 percent. During this time there has
been substantial price re-balancing as residential prices have increased in real terms, whereas
the
                                                          
17 See Ministry of Commerce, Electricity Information Disclosure Statistics, 1997, p.19
18 Source, Ministry of Commerce, unpublished paper,(1998).
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Table 3
Evolution of the New Zealand Electricity Industry
__________________________________________________________________
1961 to 1987 generation and transmission - Vertically Integrated Monopolist
            Central-Government Department
            distribution -  94 electricity.supply authorities
Trusts and Local-Government Entities
__________________________________________________________________
1987-94 generation & transmission - Vertically Integrated Monopolist
corporatised as an SOE
              distribution – local government entities corporatised
__________________________________________________________________
1998 generation – 2 SOEs
transmission - SOE
distribution (37): 7 listed companies, 28 community trusts, 2 co-operatives
spot market from 1 October 1996
Production 36,000m.GWh. (1998)
__________________________________________________________________
price for commercial users has declined. Prior to 1988 New Zealand cross-subsidised
households and even now the price for commercial and residential customers is very similar.
A number of distribution firms have merged and this will facilitate exploiting the economies
of scale (see Giles and Wyatt (1992)) that were estimated to be present in the electricity
supply authorities prior to the reforms.
New Zealand has retained public ownership of generation and transmission, and its division
of generation into two companies provides only limited competition. In addition, it is likely
that the dominance of community trust ownership in the retail distribution sector has
adversely affected the performance of that sector.19 New Zealand’s absence of price
                                                          
19 Culy, Read and Wright (1995, 59-71) canvas reasons for this choice of structure.  It is well known that the
trust form of ownership and governance means that the objectives of the board and managers are quite unclear
and, for community trusts, open to political influence. It also limits capital market disciplines on management. In
fact, 7% may represent considerable “wheeling” for that subset of customers for which “wheeling” is currently
economically feasible. The situation is changing as the cost and nature of meters change.
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consumers.20 It remains to be assessed the extent to which wheeling, additional generation,
and gas competition affect market performance.
The governance structure of the New Zealand electricity market does not include a statutory
industry-specific regulator, or specific price control. There are three sets of market rules. The
Grid Operation Security Policy (GOSP) is implemented by the state-owned enterprise (SOE)
managing transmission (Transpower). The development of GOSP is conducted by
Transpower jointly with the market administrator (the joint venture Electricity Market
Company, EMCO). EMCO has the responsibility for administering the rules of metering and
reconciliation that apply to the entire wholesale market. It also manages the electricity spot
market.
The electricity spot market, or pool, has its own governance structure. The physical networks
and contractual networks, including those applicable to the pool, are schematically described
in Figure 2. Participation in the pool is voluntary. The operation (see Figure 3) of the pool is
specified in the NZEM rules. These rules specify all aspects of the participation in, and
operation of, the spot market. Service providers (eg. the Grid Operator, the Dispatcher,
Pricing Clearing and Settlement functions) provide the services required for the operation of
the pool under fixed term contracts under the rules of NZEM.
The entire governance structure (see Figure 4) of the pool exists by virtue of contractual
obligations set out under rules developed by the market participants through their joint
venture company EMCO. There is no statutory specification of governance.  EMCO manages
the rule development process as well as administration of the rules. It has played a significant
role in the development of the spot market. It services a committee (the Market Surveillance
Committee (MSC): MSC members are chosen by market participants21) that supervises spot
market monitoring (against the rules) and acts in a judicial capacity with respect to breaches
and interpretations of the rules. The MSC has very extensive powers, and its decisions are
                                                          
20 A Bill that split retail electricity entities into line and energy firms was enacted in June 1998. It exacerbates
the trust ownership and governance problems.
21  One factor in the choice of members of the Market Surveillance Committee is independence from the day-to-
day operation of the electricity market. This could in itself be an interesting subject for a study of governance
design.
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subject to appeal, again to an industry appointed judicial board. Thus, for electricity a joint
venture company has played a significant role in market development and administration.
While it has
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Figure 4  NZEM  Governance
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not owned significant infrastructure assets it has created a market through its co-ordination of
the design and implementation of the rules that define the operation of a market that relies on
companies that do possess these assets.
Electricity poses risk management issues that are of at least as much import as any of the
networks we consider. They are of concern to market participants and consumers directly. In
addition, they have been of such political concern that they have affected the speed with
which a devolved system has been allowed to develop. While GOSP specifies the operating
standards of the grid, under pool and non-pool contracts, there is to be no specific assumption
of risk unless it is specified in contracts. That is, market participants are free to contract for
risk and thus the allocation of risk will reflect participants’ abilities and willingness to accept
risk. This is a recent aspect of the market and it is currently developing as past practices
increasingly come under scrutiny.
In electricity there has been a joint venture company co-ordinating the development of the
market, most specifically developing the pool. The starting point was the centralised control
of a vertically integrated state owned company. The joint venture company, EMCO, assumed
the market development role to conduct the centralised control and co-ordination function. Its
continuing role in market administration and on-going market development is evolving.
The pool is voluntary; thus there are open entry and exit constraints on its exercise of market
power. Furthermore there exists the possibility of the establishment of other local pools by
local retail and generating companies. This too constrains the actions of the current pool. It
can be anticipated that these constraints will become more intense with entry into all facets of
the electricity business. Additional members increase the internal co-ordination problems for
the joint venture. More profit-maximising participants in the market as a whole will add to
the competitive constraints on pool organisation. As we have argued, the rapidity of
technological change shortens planning horizons and individual company action will
generally be quicker than actions arrived at under a joint venture. These factors suggest that
unless there are very great natural monopoly characteristics solved by the pool that the
electricity market will evolve to a decentralised market system providing open entry is
sustained. This process may be greatly facilitated by the fact that the joint venture company
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itself does not own any infrastructure assets.22 The inclusion of such assets in the joint
venture - as may have been expected given the specific nature of some of certain of these
assets and a common rationale for joint ventures (Phlips (1995, 173-4)) – may have delayed
any joint venture dissolution driven by competitive forces.
To date, the basic lesson of the New Zealand model is that governance arrangements that
predispose effective co-ordination and control can be constructed under voluntary contracting
among de-centralised decision-makers.
5.2 Telecommunications
Deregulation has had more impact on the structure and governance of telecommunications
than on any other network industry in New Zealand.  The transition from Government
department to SOE in 1987, then to privatisation as Telecom New Zealand Limited in 1990
has been described elsewhere (for example, Wilson (1994), Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson and
Teece (1996)). There has been no price control, excepting the constraints on urban and rural
service provision and access pricing proscribed by the Kiwi share since privatisation in 1990.
Competition by firms with significant New Zealand infrastructure commenced in 1991 when
Clear Corporation used fiber-optic cable of the then New Zealand Railways to bypass the
Telecom network.23  It entered an interconnection contract with Telecom and has provided
domestic and international long distance services from that time.  In 1995, an interconnection
contract was agreed between Telecom and Clear which enables Clear to offer local service.
This year, a company, Saturn, has introduced a cable and telephony service to residential
households in the Wellington region. BellSouth started its GSM cell-phone service in 1994,
and now has very extensive coverage, in competition with that of Telecom. Further
competition is provided by a number of firms, including Telstra, that do not have significant
infrastructure of their own in New Zealand. In addition, there are internet and data service
providers with interconnection agreements and infrastructure some of which includes
                                                          
22 It does have an information system that keeps any subscriber continuously up-to-date with the state of New
Zealand’s electricity system, including the state of the hydro-lakes.
23 Clear Corporation is held by MCI International, British Telecom, BCL (an SOE) and Todd Corporation. Since
1991 Clear has put in a wire network that bypasses much of Telecom’s network, excepting the residential local
loop.
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wireless communications. There are a number of firms that conduct arbitrage, especially in
the international toll market. The generally very satisfactory performance of the market is
reviewed by Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson and Teece (1996) and Spiller and Gardilli (1997).
Perhaps the most contentious part of the performance of the telecommunications market has
been the time required establishing an interconnection agreement for local service between
Telecom and Clear. A core part of the dispute was Telecom’s proposal to use Baumol’s
(1983) efficient component pricing (ECP) rule. While there is not space here to evaluate the
delay in the agreement of the interconnection contract, or the efficiency of the ECP rule, it
should be noted that this rule has never actually been implemented in New Zealand
agreements.  Much of the literature on the Clear-Telecom dispute does not properly recognise
the strategic game that took place; a game that included the government because of the
government’s potential to step in and regulate prices. This agreement was one of the first of
its kind worldwide and hence very protracted negotiations could have been expected. The
network linkages created by the interconnection agreements that existed in March 1998 are
described in Figure 5. They indicate that the telecommunication networks have a variety of
interconnection points and that under these agreements some traffic can bypass the Telecom
network entirely.
In telecommunications there has been no overall governing body. The incumbent Telecom,
and the operation of the Commerce Act 1986 have achieved co-ordination at the outset of de-
regulation.  In 1990 Telecom set the network compatibility standards and, de facto, provided
operational governance of the market. As competitors have entered, they have increasingly
imposed constraints on the actions available to Telecom and shifted the market to one of
governance with de-centralised control and co-ordination. The Telecommunications Act of
1987 proscribes interconnection and tariff disclosure regulations on Telecom.
The driving force for change in telecommunications has been substantial declines in costs,
changes in economies of scale and scope, the rapid, low-cost, standardisation of network
components and the emergence of new products. Telecommunications is only once removed
from the electronics revolution and it reflects all the factors that we listed earlier as
technological change determinants of governance.  We have argued that these factors
generally predispose efficient governance that has de-centralised control and co-ordination. If
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this argument were to be accepted, how would this decentralisation take place and be
implemented?
The vastly lowered costs and changed technology of delivery makes (partial) network bypass
possible. New technology enables technologies to be bypassed by low-cost connection
between different modes of transfer: that is, it can, and does, make different networks
compatible. Viable network bypass strikes at the core of the assumption that networks are
natural monopolies. It stimulates entry and it constrains the actions of an incumbent to the
extent that bypass is a credible threat. Thus, there is a mechanism and incentive for new firms
to enter whether or not they have new products. De-centralised control is implemented by
means of interconnection. Open entry and bypass provide an incentive for incumbents to
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Figure 5: Telecommunications Network Interconnection











seriously entertain interconnection contracts, as can the threat of alternative new
technologies. These are private de-centralised incentives, that, in the New Zealand market,
has led to the pattern of interconnections depicted in Figure 5 and vigorous competition in
most aspects of telecommunications.
As with very many industries there is a tension between co-operation and competition in
telecommunications. Carter and Wright (1994) suggest that interconnection contracts may be
used as a collusive device to keep final prices up. However, as we have argued, the
expectations and uncertainty of technological change are likely to inhibit collusive
arrangements. Furthermore, the considerable numbers of players in the market, and the easy
entry and exit of arbitrage firms that trade-off price differentials within and across countries
mean that co-ordination is likely to be very difficult to maintain. In any event, collusion can
be addressed by remedies and penalties available under competition policy rather than
through the introduction of centralised control.
As with electricity, telecommunications has moved to contracting with external organisations
rather than integration within a single entity. Also as is the case with electricity, the efficient
governance regime for telecommunications has moved to one of de-centralised control and
co-ordination.
5.3 Payments System
The payments system provides a mechanism by which demand accessible funds held with
financial institutions may be transferred to a third party. In addition, it provides for the
settlement of the obligations arising between individual financial institutions as a result of the
payment institutions provided by their customers each day.  The payments system may be
divided into four functional components:
• Payment instruments such as cheques, bank machines (ATM), point of sale direct debit
(EFTPOS) terminals, and credit cards.
• Clearing systems for the receipt, processing and netting of these instructions for the
transfer of value.
43
• Settlement systems which receive information from clearing systems, and send
instructions for the transfer of net values.
• Settlement accounts at the central bank, in which individual institutions hold the funds
used to achieve the ultimate transfer of net value associated with the payment instructions
throughout the economy.
 
 There is a long history of both government regulation and joint ventures in the operation of
payments systems.
 
 Before the creation of central banks, the clearing of paper payment instruments was
undertaken in clearing houses which were usually joint ventures of the banks operating in the
major financial centres.  Out of this practice grew a tradition of government recognition of
joint venture clearing arrangements in the payments system, and this persisted after central
banks assumed the role of providing settlement accounts. Government regulation of banking
and the payments system has increased during the 20th century, driven to a significant extent
by the need to manage the risk of public guarantees of deposits and of the settlement system.
In our view, however, public policy in many countries takes too little account of the capacity
for competition and technical change (such as has made it feasible to settle gross transactions
in real time) to ameliorate the risks of payment system failure that current public policy
attempts to address.
 
 Government regulation of payments systems often reflects the historical fact that banks were
the sole providers of payments instruments, and the only institutions with the incentives to
develop the facilities associated with the core of the payments system.  Today, convergence
across the financial system means that a range of other types of institutions, including
insurers, mutual funds and consumer credit organizations manage liquid balances for
customers.  This has created a demand for much wider direct participation in the payments
system than is provided where access is restricted to banks. By access we mean the ability to






 Since the mid 1980s New Zealand has had the least-regulated financial system of any country,
including the payments system.  There is no specific legislation or regulatory requirements
governing the payments system in New Zealand, with the operation of individual networks
being governed only by the conditions agreed between the participants and the application of
commercial law / competition policy.  The central bank, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, is
not involved in the management of the payments system except through its role as the
operator of the settlement accounts and the Austraclear settlement system.  The Reserve Bank
is on record as indicating that even though only registered banks operate settlement accounts
at this time, an account would be provided to any institution that was able to demonstrate the
need and
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 Table 4: Ownership and Functions of Networks in the New Zealand Payments System
 
 1.            Who Owns What System:
 
 Bank:  ANZ  BNZ  National  Westpac
Trust
 ASB  Countrywide  TSB  Hongkong
and Shanghai
 Citibank  Bankers
Trust
 Reserve Bank   
 Network:              
              
 ISL  Owner  Owner  Owner  Owner  Owne
r
 Owner  Own
er
 Owner  Owner     
              
 ETSL   Owner  Owner  Owner  Owne
r
        
              
 KITS  Owner  Owner  Owner  Owner  Owne
r
 Owner   Owner  Owner  Owner    
              
 Austraclear
 
           Owner   
 
 2.         What Each System Clears:
 






































             
 ISL  xxxxxxx  xxxxxx  xxxxxxx  xxxxxxxx  xxxxxxx  xxxxxxxx  xxxxxxxx       
              
 ETSL         xxxxxxx  xxxxxxxxxx     
              
 ANZ         xxxxxxx  xxxxxxxxxx     
              
 KITS           xxxxxxxx  xxxxxxxxxxx   
              
 Austraclear             xxxxxxxxxxx  xxxxxxx
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 the technological capacity to operate it. 24
 
 Thus, while the actual provision of payment services in New Zealand is at present provided
only by registered banks, their position in the payments system is fully contestable.  With
respect to retail payments instruments, non-bank institutions may enter into commercial
arrangements to issue credit, EFTPOS or ATM cards by having these cleared and settled by
institutions that are direct participants in clearing and settlement.  A range of institutions that
are not registered banks issue different types of payment instruments under such commercial
arrangements, and these enter directly into the payments system for clearing and settlement.
 
 There are at present five different messaging systems providing for payment instruments to be
presented electronically.  The ownership and functions of these networks are set out in Table
4.
 
 Figure 6 shows the workings of the New Zealand Interchange Payments System in 1998,
headed by the various transactions that are processed. It is interesting to note here that over
the past five years there has been an increasing trend towards the use of electronic payment
methods - in particular, EFTPOS use grew from 8% of transactions in 1993, to 24% in
1997.25
 There are six switches, or systems, that interchange transactions, and retail banks in New
Zealand own (with varying shareholdings), and/or operate, the following:
 
• Interchange and Settlement Ltd (ISL),
• Kiwi Inter-bank Transfer System (KITS),
• Electronic Transaction Services Limited (ETSL), and
• Same-Day Cleared Payments - a new system, not fully implemented at present.
The Settlement Request Manager (SRM) which sits between the payment switches and ESAS
is also operated by the retail banks, since it is managed by Interchange and Settlement
Limited. SRM provides banks with the capacity to manage their flow of payments.
                                                          
 24 New Zealand provides registered bank status to institutions who meet international capital adequacy standards
and certain disclosure requirements, but it is not necessary to be a registered bank to undertake the business of
banking.
48
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 25 Figures from the New Zealand Bankers Association.
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Electronic Transactions Services Ltd (ETSL) and the ANZ operated system, compete directly
in the processing of EFTPOS and electronic credit card transactions.26 Presently 80% of
EFTPOS merchants are attached to the ETSL network. The ANZ switch was previously
owned by BNZ and ANZ but when these two companies separated, the latter retained control
and now operate it to gain greater flexibility and to aid its strategy to acquire more business.
As is shown in Figure 6, transaction information is independently collated by the three
entities ETSL, ANZ, and ISL, at the end of each day and is then sent to the banks so they can
calculate their balances with each of the other banks. From 7am the next morning, banks
settle their bilateral balances through Austraclear to the Settlement Request Manager and
subsequently the Exchange Settlement Account System (ESAS).
There are two features of the New Zealand payments system that are of particular interest.
First, the use of third party processors of the information from the different clearing systems
indicates the economies of scope that exist in this activity.  Second, the competition between
ETSL and the switch operated by ANZ demonstrates the feasibility of competition and bypass
in these key elements of the payment system.  It also demonstrates the importance of the
absence of any regulatory enforcement of participation in the ETSL joint venture.
It is planned that all payment switches be linked to SRM and hence ESAS, to facilitate a
greater degree of certainty in the payments system. However at present only KITS,
Austraclear (and SCP) have access to SRM and ESAS at the Reserve Bank. In this sense it is
feasible for these systems to compete, though at present their activities are largely divided
along functional lines.  KITS was owned by four of the major New Zealand banks, but as part
of the transition to real time gross settlement all banks are becoming participants in it. It
provides multilateral net settlement for high value payments associated primarily with foreign
exchange transactions.  Participation in the Austraclear system is open to any organisation of
good standing that operates in the securities markets, and this currently includes banks,
brokers, financial institutions and corporates.  Austraclear provides the mechanism for the
                                                          
26 Note that Telecom NZ Ltd provide the telecommunications services linking terminals to the ETSL and ANZ
systems, and also from ETSL and ANZ to the bank and credit card company computers.
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settlement of the daily net obligations determined within ISL. SCP, once fully implemented,
will be specifically tailored for “real estate” transactions.
Canada
The structure of the Canadian payments system is functionally similar to that of New Zealand
(Figure 7). A wide variety of payment instruments operate with purpose-built messaging and
clearing systems, and these are joint ventures rather than proprietary.  Until the creation of the
real time gross settlement system, the ACSS provides the only mechanism for the settlement
of payment instructions in Canada.
There are however, two key differences between the governance of the payments system in
Canada and New Zealand. The first difference is that in Canada the core settlement
technology of the payments system is managed by the Canadian Payments Association under
the authority provided by legislation.   The Canadian Payments Association Act of 1980
provides banks and near-bank financial institutions with an exclusive mandate to “establish
and operate a national clearings and settlement system and to plan the evolution of the
national payments system”.  The justification for this mandate lay in the presumption that the
core communication system of an efficient electronic payments system would be a natural
monopoly, and should be managed by a joint venture consisting of all regulated deposit-
taking institutions.
The Act also gives the Canadian Payments Association the right to pass rules associated with
the operation of the payments system that, when signed by the Governor in Council, have the
force of law.  The provisions of the Act, and the rules and by-laws adopted by the Canadian
payments association have in many instances had the effect of restricting the ability of non-
members of the CPA to issue payment instruments that may enter directly into the clearing
and settlement process (Mathewson and Quigley 1997). The argument is that the safety of the
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payments system requires that only CPA members enter payment items for clearing and
settlement.
A second difference between the New Zealand and Canadian payment systems is that under
the Payment clearing and Settlement Act 1996, the Bank of Canada is given an explicit role in
minimising systemic risk in the payments system and in guaranteeing the ultimate stability of
the settlement system.
The Canadian payments system therefore provides an example of a market where governance
arrangements continue to reflect the view that electronic payments networks would be natural
monopolies and that private management is inconsistent with the required levels of safety and
security. The resulting government guarantee of the settlement system, and the statutory
monopoly power given to joint venture arrangements within the Canadian Payments
association do not, in our view, provide for the optimal governance arrangements in a
marketplace that is being affected by rapid technological change. By comparison with New
Zealand and other industrialised countries the Canadian approach has:
 
a) slowed innovation and entry of new players in the provision of payment instruments,
b) allowed the development of rules which advantage the incumbents over potential new
entrants, and
c) restricted the development of direct competition in the provision of messaging, clearing
and settlement services (see Mathewson and Quigley, 1997).
6.     CONCLUSION
We have argued that technical change has removed the key natural monopoly problems
associated with network industries by reducing the costs of technical solutions to
interconnection, making by-pass feasible, and providing the potential for the entry of
competing suppliers of services.  In addition, we have suggested that the prospect of technical
change and entry has required a reassessment of strategy in network industries, especially the
payoff to co-operation in joint ventures.
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In a world in which competition within and across networks is feasible, what remains of the
traditional view that network industries require heavy-handed regulation and public
ownership?  Public ownership and heavy regulation inhibit the introduction of new
technologies, and encourage the use of industry-wide co-operation to solve co-ordination and
compatibility problems.  The benefits of open entry and competition are illustrated by the
experience of New Zealand telecommunications, electricity and payment industries.  Our
view is that a light-handed regulatory regime is necessary both to establish the potential
benefits from competition and technical change, as well as to actually obtain the benefits
associated with them.  Light-handed regulatory regimes and competition among private
sector firms represent the optimal governance arrangements for network industries.
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Figure 7: Payments Systems in Canada
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